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Abstract: Through a review of recent case history, this article examines the role of 
courts in land use decisions.  The consensus of the holdings is that a court should not 
substitute its discretion for that of a local land use board so long as the board’s decision 
was based on substantial evidence on the record.  The rational for this standard of 
deference is based on the idea that local land use boards are legislative bodies that 
understand the needs of the communities they serve.  This article highlights several 
instances where appeals courts reign in the power of trial courts that overstep judicial 
bounds by annulling valid land use board decisions.   
 
*** 
 
As it has several times in recent terms, the Court of Appeals had to restrain lower 
courts from substituting their judgments for those of local land use boards.   In Metro 
Enviro Transfer v. Village of Croton-On-Hudson,1 the Court of Appeals reiterated the 
role of the courts in reviewing discretionary land use decisions.2  The court upheld the 
village board of trustees’ denial of Metro Enviro Transfer’s application for renewal of its 
special use permit to operate a waste transfer facility in the village.  The original permit 
gave the village the right to revoke it if any of its conditions or limitations were violated.  
“Metro repeatedly and intentionally violated conditions of the permit”3
 
 and the council 
refused to reissue the permit as a result.  Metro Enviro Transfer argued and the 
supreme court agreed that because there was no actual harm to the community or the 
environment, the village’s denial of the permit renewal was arbitrary and capricious and 
not supported by substantial evidence.  During the three-year special permit, Metro 
exceeded the capacity limitations on 26 occasions and falsified records to hide the 
excesses.  The facility accepted prohibited waste at least 42 times, did not adequately 
train its personnel, kept insufficient records, and inappropriately stored tires on the site.  
Metro admitted to these violations and paid fines for many of the violations.   
 Following extensive hearings, the board denied Metro’s application to renew its 
permit.  “The Board released a 15-page statement of findings detailing its rationale, 
including a three-page chart summarizing Metro’s violations.”4  In the statement, the 
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board relies significantly on the opinion of the town consultant.  “He concluded they 
‘signify a facility that continually promises to improve but nonetheless persistently 
violates regulations that are designed to protect health and the environment.’”5
 
   
 The supreme court annulled the board’s decision finding that it was “‘impermissibly 
based, in part, upon generalized opposition, which remains uncorroborated by any 
empirical data.’”6  The appellate division reversed holding that “the [s]upreme [c]ourt 
‘erroneously substituted its own judgment for that of the Village.’”7  On appeal to the 
Court of Appeals, Metro unsuccessfully argued that “the [b]oard must show substantial 
evidence not only of violations, but of violations that actually harmed or endangered 
health or the environment.”8  The Court of Appeals concluded that “[a]lthough 
inconsequential violations would not justify non-renewal, the many violations here, and 
their willful nature, sufficiently support the [b]oard’s decision.”9  The board’s decision 
whether to grant or renew a special permit is discretionary and will be upheld as long as 
it has a proper basis and is not based solely on generalizations.  “‘[E]xpert opinion . . . 
may not be disregarded in favor of generalized community objections,’”10
 
 but as long as 
there are other grounds in the record for the decision it will be upheld.  The court held 
that substantial evidence of actual harm was not necessary and the threat of harm from 
the repeated willful violations was sufficient grounds to deny the renewal.   
 “There may, of course, be instances in which an applicant’s violation is so trifling or 
de minimis that denying renewal would be arbitrary and capricious.”11  Here, the board 
“reviewed volumes of evidence,” it heard contradictory evidence from Metro’s expert 
and its own, “weighed the evidence and concluded it ‘could no longer rely’ on Metro’s 
assurances of future compliance.’”12  “A reviewing court ‘may not substitute its own 
judgment for that of the board, even if such a contrary determination is itself supported 
by the record.’”13  “Here, the quantity and character of Metro’s violations would have 
constituted sufficient grounds to deny Metro’s renewal application on their own, with or 
without expert testimony.”14
 
    
In 2002, three Court of Appeals decisions were decided that should have put to rest 
any concerns about the attitude of the courts toward reviewing fact-based, local land 
use decisions.  The first case, Retail Property Trust v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town 
of Hempstead,15 involves the denial of a special use permit sought by a regional mall for 
its expansion to accommodate a new department store.  The ZBA denied the permit 
concluding that the proposed expansion would adversely impact traffic and air quality.  
The ZBA based its determination on facts presented to it by the project’s opponents 
regarding the air pollution and traffic to be caused by other projects approved, but not 
yet built, in the vicinity of the mall.  In overruling the appellate division reversal of the 
zoning board’s determination, the Court of Appeals held that the ZBA's decision was 
based on substantial evidence and was rational. Although the mall owner presented 
credible evidence to support its proposed expansion of the mall, the Court of Appeals 
reasoned that deference must be given to the ZBA when the record contains other 
substantial grounds on which to base a denial. 
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Several aspects of this case counter local fears that courts are hostile to their efforts 
to control development.  First, the source of the reports relied on – the project’s 
opponents – was not important to the court’s determination.  As long as the reports are 
factual and contain substantial evidence supporting the board’s decision, they are 
sufficient to justify that decision.  Second, the court’s role is not to weigh or balance the 
evidence presented in support of both sides, but simply to determine whether there was 
substantial evidence on the record that supports the board’s decision.  In other words 
the court may not substitute its judgment of the facts (and their weight) for that of the 
local administrative review board. Third, the Court of Appeals noted specifically that 
local review boards in these circumstances are entitled to judicial deference. 
In Ifrah v. Utschig,16
The Court of Appeals reversed and upheld the denial of the variances by the zoning 
board.  Essentially, it held that the appellate division erroneously performed the role of 
the local land use board by deciding which facts on the record should be used to decide 
the matter.  Under state law, area variance decisions are to be made by local zoning 
boards after balancing a number of considerations.  The Court of Appeals noted that the 
neighbors, in addition to simply voicing their opposition to the variances, placed facts on 
the record about the adverse effect of the proposed modern home in the neighborhood.  
They documented the impact of contemporary design on the neo-Tudor architectural 
style of the houses on the street, the interruption of the uniform spacing between the 
existing homes that gave them the appearance of being on larger lots, and the 
confluence of several existing driveways on the portion of the street affected by the 
driveway of the proposed new home.  These are facts.  Although they were placed on 
the record by the opponents, they do not simply reflect the unvarnished opposition of 
the neighbors.  Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals found that the zoning board 
"could rationally conclude that the detriment the proposed subdivision posed to the 
neighborhood outweighed the benefit sought by petitioner, and its determination 
denying the requested variances was not arbitrary or capricious."
 a landowner challenged the denial of a request for four area 
variances by the Town of Harrison’s zoning board of appeals.  The variances requested 
would have allowed the landowner to subdivide an already nonconforming lot and allow 
him to build a second home on the land.  The result would have been to create two lots 
- each including less than a half-acre in an area zoned for single-family housing on lots 
of at least one acre in size.  Again, the neighbors complained and put facts on the 
record about the impact on the neighborhood of the extra home and the traffic it would 
generate.  The appellate division was impressed by the fact that most of the homes in 
the neighborhood were built on substandard size lots and that more than half of them 
were on lots even smaller than those proposed by the landowner in his variance 
request.  From this, the appellate division concluded that granting the variance would 
not have an adverse effect on the neighborhood and thus the town zoning board’s 
decision was not supported by substantial evidence. 
17
In the third case, P.M.S. Assets, Ltd. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Village of 
Pleasantville,
 
18 the Court of Appeals again overruled an appellate division decision that 
reversed a zoning board determination.  In this case, neighbors in a residentially-zoned 
part of the village complained that the new owner of a lot which contained a 
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nonconforming industrial building had changed its use in violation of the local zoning 
law.  The village zoning board determined that converting the use of a warehouse from 
storing customers’ goods to housing the new business’s equipment, inventory, and 
supplies was a qualitative change in the nonconforming use of the type prohibited by 
local zoning.  Although both the supreme court and the appellate division reversed the 
board, the Court of Appeals found that the board could rationally have arrived at its 
decision and that its decision should not be disturbed by the judiciary. 
In 2004, in Pecoraro v. Board of Appeals of the Town of Hempstead,19 the Court of 
Appeals upheld the zoning board of appeal’s denial of the landowner’s area variance 
application.  The plaintiff had entered into a contract to purchase a substandard parcel 
contingent on receiving an area variance.  For a zoning board of appeals to grant a 
variance from the dimensional and area requirements of a zoning ordinance, state 
legislation requires a finding that the benefits to the applicant of the requested variance 
outweigh the detriment it will cause to the health, safety, and welfare of the 
neighborhood.20
  
  The board must weigh the benefits of the requested variance to the 
applicant against the five factors set forth in the statute. 
In Pecoraro, the Court of Appeals held that the lower courts improperly supplanted 
their own judgments for that of the board in concluding that the decision was based on 
generalized community opposition.  “The record demonstrates that the [b]oard 
reasonably considered all of the factors delineated in Town Law § 267-b and weighed 
the petitioner’s interest against the interest of the neighborhood.”21 “As the board is 
entrusted with safeguarding the character of the neighborhood in accordance with the 
zoning laws . . . it was well within its discretion to deny a variance that would have 
allowed an owner to take advantage of an illegally non-conforming parcel by erecting a 
dwelling upon it.”22
 
 
[The] Court has often noted that local zoning boards have broad discretion 
in considering applications for area variances and the judicial function in 
reviewing such decisions is a limited one.  Courts may set aside a zoning 
board determination only where the record reveals that the board acted 
illegally or arbitrarily, or abused its discretion, or that it merely succumbed 
to generalized community pressure.23
 
   
In all these Court of Appeals cases, the local board was sustained, the intermediate 
courts told not to substitute their judgments for that of the local board, and the existence 
of facts on the record was found sufficient to uphold local board decisions under the 
substantial evidence rule.  This rule was recently reiterated by Justice O’Connor in 
Lingle v. Chevron.24  This U.S. Supreme Court regulatory takings case states that 
courts are not well suited for scrutinizing the efficacy of legislative decisions and doing 
so “would empower--and might often require--courts to substitute their predictive 
judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.  Although [Lingle] is 
only the tip of the proverbial iceberg, it foreshadows the hazards of placing courts in this 
role.”25  Referring to the lower court’s finding that one expert was more persuasive than 
another, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he reasons for deference to legislative 
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judgments about the need for, and likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now 
well established, and we think they are no less applicable here.”26
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regulation.  This proceeding is before the federal Surface Transportation Board and is being opposed by 
the village. 
3 Id. at *2. 
4 Id. at *3. 
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Id. at *3-*4. 
8 Id. at *4. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. at *4-*5.  
11 Id. at *6.  
12 Id. at *6-*7. 
13 Id. (quoting Retail Prop. Trust v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 98 N.Y.2d 190 (2002)). 
14 Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 1572 at *7. 
15  98 N.Y.2d 190 (2002). 
16  98 N.Y.2d 304 (2002). 
17 Id. at 309.  
18 98 N.Y. 2d 683 (2002). 
19 2 N.Y.3d 608 (2004). 
20  N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b (McKinney 2003); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b (McKinney 2003); N.Y. GEN. 
CITY LAW § 81-b (McKinney 2003).   
21 Pecoraro, 2 N.Y.3d at 614. 
22 Id. at 615. 
23 Id. at 613. 
24 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005). 
25 Id. at 2085. 
26 Id. 
